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Our society is built on a complex web of interdependencies whose effects become             
manifest during extraordinary events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, with shocks           
in one system propagating to the others to an exceptional extent. We analyzed more              
than 100 millions Twitter messages posted worldwide in 64 languages during the            
epidemic emergency due to SARS-CoV-2 and classified the reliability of news           
diffused. We found that waves of unreliable and low-quality information anticipate           
the epidemic ones, exposing entire countries to irrational social behavior and serious            
threats for public health. When the epidemics hit the same area, reliable information             
is quickly inoculated, like antibodies, and the system shifts focus towards certified            
informational sources. Contrary to mainstream beliefs, we show that human          
response to falsehood exhibits early-warning signals that might be mitigated with           
adequate communication strategies. 
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Human societies build on social, economic, environmental and technological systems          
whose dynamics are inherently complex and often highly unpredictable in the short            
term. The effects of this deep-layered structural interdependency ​1,2 become manifest           
during extraordinary events, such as natural catastrophes or pandemics, where shocks           
propagate across systems. ​Although the level of complexity of past human societies has             
been often underestimated, it can be claimed that, in the past few decades, the              
acceleration of globalization processes has brought about an unprecedented level of           
large-scale interdependencies, from trade of goods to communications, that         
dramatically changed the temporal scales of shock propagation. However, how to map            
and understand the potential diffusion pathways which might lead to major systemic            
crises or even collapse is still unknown. 
The high levels of specialization ​3 and adaptive flexibility ​4 of human societies rely upon               
complex, multifaceted forms of cooperation, to the point of characterizing humans as a             
super-cooperator species ​5​. One would therefore expect that the human propensity to            
cooperate would be further magnified when facing major threats that put collective            
wellbeing at risk. In large, complex societies, an important mediator of large-scale            
cooperation is communication ​6​, which may be crucial to coordinate individual           
perceptions and behaviors in the pursuit of the common interest ​7​. The recent explosion              
of publicly shared, decentralized information production that characterizes digital         
societies ​8 and in particular social media activity ​9 provides an exceptional laboratory for              
the observation and the study of these complex social dynamics ​10​, and potentially             
functions as a very powerful resource to enact effective, pro-social cooperation and            
coordination in large-scale crises ​11​. Global pandemics are certainly an instance of such             
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 crises, and the current outbreak of COVID-19 may therefore be thought of as a natural               
experiment to observe social responses to a major threat that may potentially escalate to              
catastrophic levels, and has already managed to seriously affect levels of economic            
activity, and radically alter human social behaviors across the globe.  
In this study, we show that information dynamics tailored to alter individuals'            
perceptions and, consequently, their behavioral response, is able to drive collective           
attention ​12 towards false ​13,14 or inflammatory ​15 content, a phenomenon named            
infodemics ​16–19​, sharing similarities with more traditional epidemics and spreading          
phenomena ​20–22​. Contrary to what it could be expected in principle, what this natural              
experiment reveals is that, on the verge of a threatening global pandemic emergency             
due to SARS-CoV-2 ​23–25​, human communication activity is to a significant extent            
characterized by the intentional production of informational noise and even of           
misleading or false information ​26​. This generates waves of unreliable and low-quality            
information with potentially very dangerous impacts on the social capacity to respond            
adaptively at all scales by rapidly adopting those norms and behaviors that may             
effectively contain the propagation of the epidemics. Spreading false information or           
even conspiracy theories that support implausible explanations of the causal forces at            
work behind the crisis may create serious confusion and even discourage people from             
taking the crisis seriously or responsibly, all the more so, the more such signals receive               
social validation and spread across social groups and communities ​27​. Therefore, if on             
the one hand we face the risks of a global epidemics threat, requiring outstanding              
efforts for modeling and anticipating the time course of the spreading ​25​, on the other               
hand we can speak of an infodemics threat ​28​, where low-quality content provides an              
alternative for news consumption to unclear official communications. The infodemics          
can be thought, similarly to epidemics, as an outbreak of false rumors and fake news               
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 with unexpected effects on social dynamics (see Fig. 1). In fact, the dangerousness of              
infodemics can compare and sum up to a large extent to that of the epidemics itself ​29​. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: ​How infodemics works​. Human and non-human accounts forge unreliable content – such as fake                
or untrustworthy news – about the COVID19, a topic attracting the collective attention of the whole                
world. Their followers are exposed to such content, and reshare it, becoming infectious agents:              
infodemics realizes when multiple spreading processes co-occur. Some users might be exposed multiple             
times to the same content or to different contents generated by distinct accounts, as in epidemics spread. 
 
As shown in Fig. 1, an infodemics is the result of the simultaneous action of multiple                
human and non-human sources of fake or unreliable news. As users are repeatedly hit              
by a given message from different sources, this works as an indirect validation of its               
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 reliability and relevance, leading the user to spread it in turn, and to become an               
informationally infectious agent. 
The COVID-19 crisis allows us to provide a rigorous, evidence-based assessment of            
such risks, and of the real-time interaction of the infodemic and epidemic layers ​21​.  
We focus our attention on the analysis of messages posted on a popular microblogging              
platform ​30​, an online social network characterized by heterogeneous connectivity ​31 and            
topological shortcuts typical of small-world systems ​32​. Information spreading on this           
type of networks is well understood in terms of global cascades in a population of               
individuals who have to choose between complementary alternatives, while accounting          
for the behavior and the relative size of their social neighborhood ​33​, and accounting for               
factors which characterize the popularity of specific content, like the memory time of             
users and the underlying connectivity structure ​34​. However, the exact fundamental           
mechanisms responsible for the spread of false information and inflammatory content,           
e.g. during political events ​15,35 ​36,37​, remains fundamentally unknown. Recently, it has            
been suggested that this challenging phenomenon might be due to the fact that, at              
population level, the dynamics of multiple interacting contagions are indistinguishable          
from social reinforcement ​38​. 
This peculiar feature suggests that infodemics of news consumption should be analyzed            
through the lens of epidemiology to gain insights about the role of human and              
non-human activities in spreading reliable as well as unreliable news. To this aim, we              
monitored the social media and collected more than 112 millions messages in 64             
languages from around the world about COVID-19, between 21 January and 10 March             
2020 (see Methods for details). 
By using state-of-the-art machine learning techniques to analyze the online behavior of            
users (see Methods for details), we have discovered an extraordinary activity of            
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 automated agents, referred to as social bots ​14,15,35,39​. Specifically, we estimate that 40.4%             
of online messages during this period were due to such automated agents, doubling the              
activity with respect to estimates of only four years ago ​35​.  
Where available, we have extracted URLs from messages, collecting about 20.7 millions            
links (3.3 millions unique) pointing to websites external to the platform. Each URL is              
therefore used for fact-checking, inheriting the reliability of its source (see Methods).            
About 50% of URLs have been fact-checked by screening almost 4,000 expert-curated            
web domains, whereas the remaining corpus was pointing to disappeared web pages or             
to content not classifiable automatically (eg, videos on YouTube) and unpopular           
sources. This method allowed us to overcome the limitations due to text mining of              
different languages for the analysis of narratives.  
To better understand the diffusion of these contents across countries, we have filtered             
messages with geographic information. About 0.84% of collected posts were geo-tagged           
by the user, providing highly accurate information about their geographic location.           
However, by geocoding the information available in users' profiles, we were able to             
extend the corpus of geolocated messages to about 56% of the total observed volume              
(see Methods). A total of more than 60 millions geolocated messages, containing more             
than 9 millions news have been analyzed. For each message, we have used an accurate               
machine learning approach to classify the author as human or non-human (i.e., bot),             
while keeping the distinction between verified and unverified users. Usually,          
verification is performed by the social platform to clearly identify accounts of public             
interest and certify they are authentic. The number of followers K​u of a single user ​u                
defines the exposure, in terms of potential visualizations at first-order approximation,           
of a single message ​m posted by user ​u at time ​t​. Let indicate the set of                  
messages posted by user ​u in a time window of length ​Δt​. Since there are four different                 
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 classes of users – namely verified bots (VB), unverified bots (UB), verified humans (VH)              
and unverified humans (UH) – we define the exposure due to a single class ​C​i (​i =                 
VB,UB,VH,UH​) as  
      (1) 
Note that different users of the same class might have overlapping social            
neighborhoods: those neighbors might be reached multiple times by the messages           
coming from distinct users of the same class, therefore our measure of exposure             
accounts for this effect. Note that our measure provides a lower bound to the number of                
exposed users, because we do not track higher-order transmission pathways: a user            
might adopt a content by reading it, while not resharing it. In this case there is no way                  
to account for such users. 
Finally, for each message, we identify the presence of links pointing to external             
websites: for each link we verify if it comes from a trustworthy source or not (see                
Methods). The reliability ​r​m of a single message ​m is either 0 or 1, because we discard all                  
web links that can not be easily assessed, such as the ones shortened by third-party               
services that expired or point to unreachable destinations, and the ones pointing to             
external platforms, such as YouTube, where it is not possible to automatically classify             
the reliability of the content. The news reliability of messages produced by a specific              
class of users is therefore defined as 
        (2) 
Unreliability can be defined similarly, replacing ​r​m with ​1-r​m​. Exposure and reliability            
are useful descriptors that, however, do not capture alone the risk of infodemics. For              
this reason we have developed an Infodemic Risk Index (IRI) which quantifies the rate              
7 
 at which a generic user is exposed to unreliable news produced by a specific class of                
users (partial IRI) or by any class of users (IRI): 
        (3) 
                         (4) 
Both indices are well defined and range from 0 (no infodemic risk) to 1 (maximum               
infodemic risk). Note that we can calculate all the infodemics descriptors introduced            
above at a desired level of spatial and temporal resolution. IRI is robust to user               
classification, making it an indicator not sensitive to performances of bot detection            
algorithms. 
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Fig. 2: ​Mapping the infodemic risk worldwide​. The infodemic risk of each country, aggregated over               
time, is color-coded on the map. Panels show the evolution of the risk over time for some countries: bars                   
indicate the contribution of each category (human/bot, verified/unverified) to the overall risk. The risk              
evolution for the whole world is also shown, demonstrating an overall decrease over time              
(bottom-middle panel). Markers horizontally aligned at the top of each panel indicate the daily confirmed               
epidemiological cases, with their number encoded by markers’ size. 
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 Figure 2 shows how countries characterized by different levels of infodemic risk present             
very different profiles of news sources. In a low-risk country such as South Korea, the               
level of infodemic risk remains small throughout apart from an isolated spike in the              
early phase. As the contagion spreads to significant levels, the infodemic risk further             
decreases, signalling an increasing focus of the public opinion toward reliable news            
sources. Canada presents a slightly higher level of infodemic risk, and unlike South             
Korea, we see that the risk level increases as the epidemics spread, but stays at low                
levels. At the opposite, in a high-risk country such as Venezuela, the infodemics is in               
full swing throughout the period of observation, and in addition to the expected             
activity from unverified sources one notices that even verified ones contribute to a large              
extent to the infodemics. The relationship with biological contagion patterns cannot be            
checked here due to lack of reliable data. Finally, in a relatively high-risk country such               
as Russia we notice that infodemic risk is erratic with sudden, very pronounced spikes,              
and again also verified sources play a major role. Here too, information about the              
epidemics is fragmented and mostly unreliable. Overall, the global level of infodemic            
risk tends to decrease as the epidemics spread globally, suggesting that evidence of the              
expansion of the contagion leads people to look for relatively more reliable sources, and              
that verified influencers with many followers started inoculating the system with more            
reliable news (see Supplementary Figures 3 and 4), playing a role that presents             
interesting analogies to that of antibodies in the treatment of an infectious disease. This              
overall pattern is confirmed in terms of measures of Infodemic Risk aggregated daily             
and at country level (Fig. 3 and Supplementary Fig. 5). The effect is particularly              
pronounced with the escalation of the epidemics, suggesting that this effect could be             
mediated by levels of perceived social alarm. It is also interesting to observe though              
that countries with high infodemic risk might also be more unreliable in terms of              
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 reporting of epidemic data, thus altering the perceptions of people and indirectly            
misleading them in their search for reliable information. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: ​Positive behavioral response to infodemics after COVID-19 hits countries​. Aggregated view of              
the evolution of the infodemic risk index (IRI) for increasing number of reported cases. For each day and                  
each of the 178 countries considered in our analysis, we compute the cumulative mean of the Infodemic                 
Risk Index (computed as the cumulative sum of the IRI between the 22nd of January and specific day and                   
the number of days in this date range). We aggregate days and countries with a similar cumulative                 
number of reported cases, using bins of increasing size to compensate for the limited number of countries                 
that reached high levels of contagion at the time of the analysis and reporting the average value in the x                    
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 axis. This allows us to describe, using boxplots, the drop in IRI as the number of cases grows in a country.                     
Note that, in boxplots, the difference between two boxes is significant when corresponding middle lines               
lie outside of each other. 
 
However, also the dynamic profiles of infodemic risk in countries with similar risk             
levels may be very different. Fig. 4 compares Italy with the United States. In the case of                 
Italy the risk is mostly due to the activity of unverified sources, but we notice that with                 
the outbreak of the epidemics, the production of misinformation literally collapses and            
there is a sudden shift to reliable sources. For the USA, misinformation is mainly driven               
by ​verified sources, and it remains basically constant even after the epidemics outbreak.             
Notice also how infodemic risk varies substantially across US states. As the USA lag              
significantly behind Italy in terms of the epidemics progression, it remains to be             
checked whether a similar readjustment is going to be observed for the USA later on.               
Fig. 4 shows, however, that the relationship between reduction of infodemic risk and             
expansion of the epidemics seems to be a rather general trend, as the relationship              
between number of confirmed cases and infodemic risk is (nonlinearly) negative,           
confirming the result shown in Fig. 3. Fig. 4 also shows how the evolution of infodemic                
risk among countries with both high message volume and significant epidemic           
contagion tends to be very asymmetric, with major roles played not only by countries              
such as Iran, but also United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Norway             
maintaining their relative levels, and other countries like Italy, South Korea and Japan             
significantly reducing it with the progression of the epidemics. 
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Fig. 4: ​Infodemic evolution is country-dependent​. (A) as in Fig. 2, for European Union and USA at a                  
finer resolution, with a detailed map for Italy (regional resolution). Areas with less than 10 messages,                
were excluded from the analysis and color-coded in grey. Note the striking drop in the Italian infodemic                 
risk index coinciding with the first official report of non-imported epidemiological cases. (B) Risk              
evolution for countries characterized by a high volume of messages per day (at least one day with more                  
than 2,000) and a high number of epidemiological cases (at least one day with more than 100). Countries                  
respond in different ways to infodemics. (C) The number of epidemiological cases is shown against the                
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 infodemic risk index for all countries with at least one confirmed COVID19 case. Countries are colored by                 
their Continent, with size proportional to the daily volume of messages generated. The shaded area and                
the dashed curve encode a local polynomial regression fit, here shown as a guide for the eye to highlight                   
the highly nonlinear pattern relating epidemics and infodemics indices. China has to be considered as a                
major outlier due to its role in the global epidemic in terms of timing and size of the contagion, which                    
makes it difficult to compare to other countries, and has therefore been removed from this analysis. 
 
Our findings demonstrate that, in a highly digitalized society, the epidemic and the             
infodemic dimensions of a pandemic must be seen as two sides of the same coin. ​The                
infodemics is typically driven by the combined action of both human and non-human             
actors (bots), which pursue largely undisclosed goals​. Perceived and actual biological           
and social risks feed upon one another, and may co-evolve in complex ways. Especially              
in situations where effective therapies to contrast the diffusion of the pandemic are not              
readily available, coordination of behaviors and diffusion of pro-social orientations          
driven by reliable information at all scales are the key resources for the mitigation of               
adverse effects. In this perspective, we can therefore think of an integrated public health              
approach where the biological and informational dimensions are equally recognized,          
taken into account, and managed through careful policy design. This could potentially            
include the birth of new, highly specialized professional figures such as that of the              
“infodemiologist”. 
Here, we have shown that in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, complex infodemic              
effects are indeed at work, with significant variations across countries, where level of             
socio-economic development is not the key discriminant to separate countries with high            
vs. low infodemic risk. In fact, we find that there are G9 countries with remarkable               
infodemic risk and developing countries with far lower risk levels. This means that,             
especially in countries where infodemic risk is high, the eventual speed and            
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 effectiveness of the containment of the COVID-19 could depend on a prompt regime             
switch in communication strategies and in the effective countervailing of the most            
active sources of the most dangerous categories of fake news. The escalation of the              
epidemics leads people to progressively pay attention to more reliable sources thus            
potentially limiting the impact of the infodemics, but the actual speed of adjustment             
may make a major difference in determining the social outcome, and in particular             
between a controlled epidemics and a global pandemics. This casts new light on the              
social mechanics of the infodemics-epidemics interaction, and may be of help to policy             
makers to design a more integrated strategic approach, by suitably embedding           
communication and information management into a comprehensive, extended public         
health perspective.  
 
 
References 
 
1. Buldyrev, S. V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H. E. & Havlin, S. Catastrophic 
cascade of failures in interdependent networks. ​Nature​ ​464,​ 1025–1028 (2010). 
2. Gao, J., Buldyrev, S. V., Stanley, H. E. & Havlin, S. Networks formed from 
interdependent networks. ​Nat. Phys.​ ​8,​ 40–48 (2011). 
3. Cosmides, L., Barrett, H. C. & Tooby, J. Colloquium paper: adaptive specializations, 
social exchange, and the evolution of human intelligence. ​Proc Natl Acad Sci USA​ ​107 
Suppl 2,​ 9007–9014 (2010). 
4. Cortina, M. Adaptive flexibility, cooperation, and prosocial motivations: the 
emotional foundations of becoming human. ​Psychoanalytic Inquiry​ ​37,​ 436–454 (2017). 
15 
 5. Nowak, M. & Highfield, R. ​SuperCooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need 
Each Other to Succeed​. (Simon and Schuster, 2011). 
6. Miller, J. H., Butts, C. T. & Rode, D. Communication and cooperation. ​J. Econ. Behav. 
Organ.​ ​47,​ 179–195 (2002). 
7. Balliet, D. Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analytic 
Review. ​Journal of Conflict Resolution​ ​54,​ 39–57 (2010). 
8. Benkler, Y. ​The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and 
Freedom​. 528 (Yale University Press, 2006). 
9. Fuchs, C. ​Social media: A critical introduction​. (SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014). 
doi:10.4135/9781446270066 
10. Giglietto, F., Rossi, L. & Bennato, D. The Open Laboratory: Limits and Possibilities of 
Using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube as a Research Data Source. ​J. Technol. Hum. 
Serv.​ ​30,​ 145–159 (2012). 
11. Ojo, A. & Mellouli, S. Deploying governance networks for societal challenges. ​Gov. 
Inf. Q.​ (2016). doi:10.1016/j.giq.2016.04.001 
12. De Domenico, M. & Altmann, E. G. Unraveling the origin of social bursts in collective 
attention. ​Sci. Rep.​ ​10,​ 4629 (2020). 
13. Vosoughi, S., Roy, D. & Aral, S. The spread of true and false news online. ​Science​ ​359, 
1146–1151 (2018). 
14. Shao, C. ​et al.​ The spread of low-credibility content by social bots. ​Nat. Commun.​ ​9, 
4787 (2018). 
15. Stella, M., Ferrara, E. & De Domenico, M. Bots increase exposure to negative and 
16 
 inflammatory content in online social systems. ​Proc Natl Acad Sci USA​ ​115, 
12435–12440 (2018). 
16. Eysenbach, G. Infodemiology: The epidemiology of (mis)information. ​Am. J. Med. 
113,​ 763–765 (2002). 
17. Eysenbach, G. Infodemiology and infoveillance: framework for an emerging set of 
public health informatics methods to analyze search, communication and publication 
behavior on the Internet. ​J. Med. Internet Res.​ ​11,​ e11 (2009). 
18. Eysenbach, G. Infodemiology and infoveillance tracking online health information 
and cyberbehavior for public health. ​Am. J. Prev. Med.​ ​40,​ S154-8 (2011). 
19. Zarocostas, J. How to fight an infodemic. ​Lancet​ ​395,​ 676 (2020). 
20. Pastor-Satorras, R., Castellano, C., Van Mieghem, P. & Vespignani, A. Epidemic 
processes in complex networks. ​Rev. Mod. Phys.​ ​87,​ 925–979 (2015). 
21. De Domenico, M., Granell, C., Porter, M. A. & Arenas, A. The physics of spreading 
processes in multilayer networks. ​Nat. Phys.​ ​12,​ 901–906 (2016). 
22. Brockmann, D. & Helbing, D. The hidden geometry of complex, network-driven 
contagion phenomena. ​Science​ ​342,​ 1337–1342 (2013). 
23. Huang, C. ​et al.​ Clinical features of patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in 
Wuhan, China. ​Lancet​ ​395,​ 497–506 (2020). 
24. Zhu, N. ​et al.​ A Novel Coronavirus from Patients with Pneumonia in China, 2019. ​N. 
Engl. J. Med.​ ​382,​ 727–733 (2020). 
25. Chinazzi, M. ​et al.​ The effect of travel restrictions on the spread of the 2019 novel 
coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak. ​Science​ (2020). doi:10.1126/science.aba9757 
17 
 26. Lazer, D. M. J. ​et al.​ The science of fake news. ​Science​ ​359,​ 1094–1096 (2018). 
27. Waszak, P. M., Kasprzycka-Waszak, W. & Kubanek, A. The spread of medical fake 
news in social media – The pilot quantitative study. ​Health Policy and Technology​ ​7, 
115–118 (2018). 
28. Leung, G. M. & Leung, K. Crowdsourcing data to mitigate epidemics. ​The Lancet 
Digital Health​ (2020). doi:10.1016/S2589-7500(20)30055-8 
29. Brainard, J., Hunter, P. R. & Hall, I. R. An agent-based model about the effects of fake 
news on a norovirus outbreak. ​Rev Epidemiol Sante Publique​ (2020). 
doi:10.1016/j.respe.2019.12.001 
30. Kwak, H., Lee, C., Park, H. & Moon, S. What is Twitter, a social network or a news 
media? in ​Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web - WWW ’10 
591 (ACM Press, 2010). doi:10.1145/1772690.1772751 
31. Barabasi, A. L. & Albert, R. Emergence of scaling in random networks. ​Science​ ​286, 
509–512 (1999). 
32. Watts, D. J. & Strogatz, S. H. Collective dynamics of “small-world” networks. ​Nature 
393,​ 440–442 (1998). 
33. Watts, D. J. A simple model of global cascades on random networks. ​Proc Natl Acad 
Sci USA​ ​99,​ 5766–5771 (2002). 
34. Gleeson, J. P., O’Sullivan, K. P., Baños, R. A. & Moreno, Y. Effects of network 
structure, competition and memory time on social spreading phenomena. ​Phys. Rev. 
X​ ​6,​ 021019 (2016). 
35. Bessi, A. & Ferrara, E. Social bots distort the 2016 U.S. Presidential election online        
18 
                  discussion. ​FM​ ​21,​ (2016). 
36. Aral, S. & Eckles, D. Protecting elections from social media manipulation. ​Science​ ​365, 
858–861 (2019). 
37. Stella, M., Cristoforetti, M. & De Domenico, M. Influence of augmented humans in 
online interactions during voting events. ​PLoS ONE​ ​14,​ e0214210 (2019). 
38. Hébert-Dufresne, L., Scarpino, S. V. & Young, J.-G. Macroscopic patterns of 
interacting contagions are indistinguishable from social reinforcement. ​Nat. Phys. 
(2020). doi:10.1038/s41567-020-0791-2 
39. Ferrara, E., Varol, O., Davis, C., Menczer, F. & Flammini, A. The rise of social bots. 
Commun. ACM​ ​59,​ 96–104 (2016). 
40. Pfeffer, J., Mayer, K. & Morstatter, F. Tampering with Twitter’s Sample API. ​EPJ Data 
Sci.​ ​7,​ 50 (2018). 
41. Ferrara, E. Disinformation and social bot operations in the run up to the 2017 French 
presidential election. ​FM​ ​22,​ (2017). 
 
 
Methods 
 
Data collection 
 
We have followed a consolidated strategy for collecting social media data. We focused on Twitter,               
which is well-known for providing access to publicly available messages upon specific requests             
through their application programming interface (API). We have identified a set of hashtags and              
keywords gaining special collective attention, namely: ​coronavirus, ncov, #Wuhan, covid19,          
covid-19, sarscov2, covid​. This set includes the official name of the virus and the disease,               
including the preliminary ones, as well as the name of the city of the first epidemic outbreak. We                  
have used the Filter API – to collect the data in real time from 24 Jan 2020 to 10 Mar 2020 – and                       
of the Search API – to collect the data between 21 Jan 2020 and 24 Jan 2020. Our choice allowed                    
19 
 us to monitor, without interruptions and regardless of the language, all the tweets posted about               
COVID19 since when China reported more than 6,000 cases (20 Jan 2020), calling for the               
attention of the international community. The Stream API has the advantage of providing ​all the               
messages satisfying our selection criteria and posted to the platform in the period of observation,               
provided that their volume is not larger than 1% of the overall – unfiltered – volume of posted                  
messages. Above 1% of the overall flow of information, the Filter API provides a sample of                
filtered tweets and communicates an estimate of the amount of lost messages. Note that this choice                
is the safest as to date: in fact, it has been recently shown that biases affecting Sample API (which                   
samples data based on rate limits), for instance, are not found in REST and Filter APIs ​40​. 
We estimate that until 24 Feb 2020 we lost about 60,000 tweets out of millions, capturing more                 
than 99.5% of all messages posted (see Supplementary Fig. 1). The global attention towards              
COVID19 increased the volume of messages after 25 Feb 2020: however, Twitter restrictions             
allowed us to get no more than 4.5 millions messages per day, on average. We have estimated a                  
total of 161.2 millions tweets posted until 10 Mar 2020: we have successfully collected 112.6               
millions of them, providing an unprecedented opportunity for infodemics analysis.  
 
Human vs non-human classification 
 
The classification of users into humans and non-humans (ie, bots) is based on machine learning. It                
is based on a well established algorithm based on deep learning ​37 with state-of-the-art accuracy               
15,41​. More in detail, our method has the highest accuracy (>90%) and precision in identifying bots                
(>95%) when compared with state-of-the-art methods. Our deep neural network model has the             
advantage to be more stable in the classification of certain users playing the role of broadcasters.                
Note that in this study we are making an explicit difference between verified and unverified               
human/non-human users. In fact, verified users should be considered as more authentic than             
unverified ones, because Twitter makes use of strict criteria for verification. Therefore, verified bot              
accounts might be broadcasters (whose behavior is manifestly different from the average behavior             
of a single human) or, in some cases, even celebrities and any case where it is very likely that the                    
account is managed automatically and exhibits a non-human classical behavior.  
 
Fact Checking 
 
We have collected manually-checked web domains from multiple publicly available databases,           
including scientific and journalistic ones. Specifically, we have considered data shared by: 
● M. Zimdar for the Washington Post (2016). 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/18/my-fake-news-list-went-v
iral-but-made-up-stories-are-only-part-of-the-problem/ 
● C. Silverman for BuzzFeed News (2017). 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/inside-the-partisan-fight-for-your-ne
ws-feed 
● Fake News Watch (2015). 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180213181029/http://www.fakenewswatch.com/ 
● PolitiFact (2017). 
https://www.politifact.com/article/2017/apr/20/politifacts-guide-fake-news-websites-and-w
hat-they/ 
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 ● Bufale.net (2018). ​https://www.bufale.net/the-black-list-la-lista-nera-del-web/ 
● Starbird et al, ICWSM (2018) 
● Fletcher et al, Factsheets, Reuters Institute and U. of Oxford (2018). 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/our-research/measuring-reach-fake-news-and-online
-disinformation-europe 
● Grinberg et al, Science 363, 374 (2019) 
● MediaBiasFactCheck (2020). ​https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/ 
 
However, databases adopted different labeling schemes to classify web domains, therefore we first             
had to develop a unifying classification scheme, reported in the table below, and map all existing                
categories to a unique set of categories. Note that we have also mapped those categories to a                 
coarse-grain classification scheme, distinguishing just between ​reliable ​and ​unreliable​. 
 
Category Harm 
Score 
Type Description 
SCIENCE 1 RELIABLE Domains providing content validated by 
scientific scrutiny 
MAINSTREAM 
MEDIA 
2 RELIABLE Domains providing content that generally 
goes through professional fact checking 
and generally abiding by the rules of media 
accountability 
SATIRE 3 UNRELIABLE Domains providing content and is 
intentionally and explicitly aiming at 
providing a distorted representation of 
events as a form of humor and/or social 
critique 
CLICKBAIT 4 UNRELIABLE Domain providing content that generally 
distorts or intentionally misrepresents 
information to capture attention 
OTHER 5 UNKNOWN Domains pointing to general content that 
can not be easily classified, such as videos 
on YouTube. 
SHADOW 6 UNKNOWN Domains related to URL shortening, that 
can be classified ​a priori​. We follow these 
URLs to get the unshortened URLs and 
assign this category only when 
unshortening is not successful. 
POLITICAL 7 UNRELIABLE Domains providing content that present a 
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 partisan representation and interpretation of 
facts to support a political position at the 
expense of rival ones.  
FAKE/HOAX 8 UNRELIABLE Domains providing manipulative and 
fabricated content with the purpose of 
misleading the public opinion on socially 
relevant issues and to provoke 
inflammatory responses 
CONSPIRACY/JUNK
SCI 
9 UNRELIABLE Domains providing systematically 
manipulative and fabricated content with 
the purpose of legitimizing implausible 
conceptualizations of facts and knowledge 
through argumentative methods that 
coarsely mimic those of scientific 
reasoning, generally targeting individuals 
or social groups as covert perpetrators of 
conspiracies or harmful actions  
 
 
We have found a total of 4,988 domains, reduced to 4,417 after removing hard duplicates across                
databases. Note that a domain is considered a hard duplicate if its name and its classification                
coincides across databases. 
A second level of filtering is applied to domains which are classified differently across databases               
(e.g., xyz.com might be classified as FAKE/HOAX in a database and as SATIRE in another               
database). To deal with these cases, we have adopted our own expert classification, by assigning to                
each category a ​Harm Score between 1 and 9. When two or more domains are soft duplicates, we                  
keep the classification with the highest Harm Score, as a conservative choice. This phase of               
processing reduced the overall database to unique 3,920 domains. 
 
The Harm Score classifies sources in terms of their potential contribution to the manipulative and               
mis-informative character of an infodemic. As a general principle, the more systematic and             
intentionally harmful the knowledge manipulation and data fabrication, the higher the Harm Score             
(HS). ​Scientific content has the lowest level of HS due to the rigorous process of validation carried                 
out through scientific methods. ​Mainstream media content has the second lowest level of HS due               
to its constant scrutiny in terms of fact checking and media accountability. ​Satire is an unreliable                
source of news but due to its explicit goal of distorting or mis-representing information according               
to the specific cultural codes of humor and social critique, is generally identified with ease as an                 
unreliable source. ​Clickbait is a more dangerous source (and thus ranking higher in HS) due to its                 
intent to pass fabricated or mis-represented information and facts for true, with the main purpose of                
attracting attention and online traffic, that is, for mostly commercial purposes, but without a clear               
ideological intent. ​Other is a general purpose category that contains diverse forms of (possibly)              
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 misleading or fabricated content, not easily classifiable but likely including bits of ideologically             
structured content pursuing systematic goals of social manipulation, and thus ranking higher in HS.              
Shadow is a similar category to the previous one, where in addition links are anonymized and often                 
temporary, thereby adding an extra element of unaccountability and manipulation that translates            
into a higher level of HS. ​Political is a category where we find an ample spectrum of content with                   
varying levels of distortion and manipulation of information, also including mere selective            
reporting and omission, whose goal is that of building consensus for a political position against               
others, and therefore directly aiming at polluting the public discourse and opinion making, with a               
comparatively higher level of HS with respect to the previous categories. ​Fake/hoax contains             
entirely manipulated or fabricated inflammatory content which is intended to be perceived as             
realistic and reliable and whose goal may also be political, but fails to meet the basic rules of                  
plausibility and accountability, thus reaching a even higher level of HS. Finally, the highest level               
of HS is associated to ​conspiracy/junk science​, that is, to strongly ideological, inflammatory             
content that aims at building conceptual paradigms that are entirely alternative and oppositional to              
tested and accountable knowledge and information, with the intent of building self-referential            
bubbles where fidelized audiences are simply refusing a priori any kind of knowledge or              
information that is not legitimized by the alternative source itself or by recognized affiliates, as it is                 
typical in sects of religious or other nature. 
 
A third level of filtering concerned poorly defined domains, e.g., the ones explicitly missing              
top-level domain names, such as .com .org etc, as well as the domains not classifiable with our                 
proposed scheme. This action reduced the database to the final number of 3,892 entries, whose               
statistics are reported in the tables below (see also Supplementary Fig. 2). 
 
Category Count 
CLICKBAIT 47 
CONSPIRACY/JUNK
SCI 
426 
FAKE/HOAX 917 
MSM 1284 
OTHER 160 
POLITICAL 697 
SATIRE 177 
SCIENCE 150 
SHADOW 34 
Total 3892 
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 Type Count 
RELIABLE 1434 
UNRELIABLE 2264 
UNKNOWN 194 
Total 3892 
 
 
Data availability 
The datasets generated during the current study are available from the corresponding            
author on reasonable request. Aggregated information, compliant with all privacy          
regulations on this matter, are publicly available online at the Infodemics Observatory            
(​http://covid19obs.fbk.eu/​) and on a permanent repository (Zenodo address/DOI will be          
with the publication of this manuscript). 
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 Supplementary Figures 
 
Supplementary Fig. 1: ​The evolution over time of the Twitter activity about the COVID19              
pandemic (see Methods). We can observe a first increase in collective attention after the outbreak               
in Wuhan, China (between 24 Jan and 02 Feb 2020) and a second strong rise after the epidemics                  
began to spread in northern Italy (20 Feb 2020 onwards). The fraction of Geoolocated (messages               
with shared locations, or geonamed, indicated in green) is constantly about 56% of the total               
volume recorded (indicated in blue). From 26 Feb, we reached the limit of the fraction of data                 
shared by Twitter (see Methods), missing an increasing fraction of Tweets (indicated in red). 
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Supplementary Fig. 2: Temporal distribution of news shared on Twitter about COVID19,            
stratified by the category used in the fact-checking stage (see Methods). OTHER indicates URLs              
which point to general content (like YouTube videos), while SHADOW indicates shortened URLs             
which could not be unshortened (e.g., because pointing to removed web pages). Reliable news              
includes MSM and SCIENCE, whereas unreliable news includes the remaining categories. This            
analysis demonstrates that reliable sources are more represented than unreliable ones: however,            
they circulate in different ways and reach different targets, a feature that is perfectly captured by                
the infodemic risk index introduced in this study. 
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Supplementary Fig. 3: The fraction of unreliable news shared by the different classes of accounts.               
Unverified users, both humans and bots, share a larger fraction of unreliable news than verified               
users. We observe some differences between the values estimated on the Geolocated data used in               
this paper (red), and the values associated with the whole sample of Tweets recorded (blue). The                
difference, possibly caused by the correlation of this kind of behaviour with the choice of how                
customising the field "location" of one's profile, corresponds to a slight overestimate for unverified              
accounts and an underestimate of the fraction of fake news for verified profiles. As verified               
profiles participate in the risk index more strongly, we can expect the estimate of risk to be only                  
greater if we could include all users. 
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Supplementary Fig. 4: The probability distribution of the number of followers for the four classes               
of users considered in this study. All distributions display a fat-tail, but different categories of users                
have a different outreach. The unverified profiles have a significantly smaller number of followers              
than the verified ones. At the same time, profiles identified as bots have a larger number of                 
followers. The average values are: 660 for Unverified Humans (circles), 1400 for Unverified Bots              
(squares, 51k for Verified Humans (stars) and 240k for Verified Bots (diamonds). 
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Supplementary Fig. 5: ​A second aggregated view of the evolution of risk index for increasing               
number of confirmed cases. Differently from Fig. 3, here we compute the average risk index for a                 
single day in each country (instead of the cumulative value), for a total of 177 countries excluding                 
China the origin of the COVID19 outbreak. We first compute the average value for days with no                 
confirmed cases, which is 0.276 (blue line in figure). We then aggregate all days with confirmed                
cases in homogeneous bins and compute the average values (red points). We observe that reporting               
of the first case is associated with a drop in the risk index, followed by an increase back to the                    
"natural level" in correspondence of 3 confirmed cases. Then, as the epidemics gain strength, the               
infodemic risk index decreases again, confirming what observed in Fig. 3. All shaded areas              
represent the s.e.m of the average risk index, error bars encode the 95% confidence intervals. 
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